CLAUSEWITZ (Carl von). De la Guerre. Paris, librairie milita - Lot 3

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CLAUSEWITZ (Carl von). De la Guerre. Paris, librairie milita - Lot 3
CLAUSEWITZ (Carl von). De la Guerre. Paris, librairie militaire, maritime et polytechnique de J. Corréard, 1849-1851. 6 parts in 3 volumes in-8, xxiv-479-(one blank) + 599-(one blank) + 503-(one blank) pp. half-red basane, threaded smooth spines with "campenon" gilded in the tail, speckled edges; third part erroneously bound before the second, slightly rubbed headbands, scattered foxing, heavier on the first leaves of the 3rd volume; a few pencil lines. First edition of the first French translation of the text, provided by Belgian artillery major Jean-Baptiste Neuens (1812-1881), whose military background guarantees an adequate interpretation of the treaty's lexical field. It was also based on the original German edition (Vom Krieg, Berlin, Ferdinand Dümmler, 1832-1834), before the text was manipulated, as was the case with the second German edition (1853). The Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), an efficient and courageous officer, historian of revolutionary and imperial wars, and leading military theorist, began his military career at the age of thirteen, taking part as a line officer in the wars against the French Revolution, before studying at the Berlin Military Academy. Graduating top of his class, he was aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia, and fought against the French in 1806, but was captured at Auerstedt and held prisoner until 1808. On his return, he worked alongside Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst to reform the Prussian army, making it more efficient and strengthening its patriotic spirit, with the innovative idea of contributing to the freedom and unity of Germany. In 1810, he was appointed professor at the Military Academy, but when Napoleon I forced Prussia into an alliance in 1812, he went into exile and entered the service of Russia: it was under Russian uniform, as staff lieutenant-colonel, that he negotiated the surrender of the Prussian corps of the Grande Armée (1812) and took part in the campaigns of 1813, 1814 and 1815, serving in particular at the Battle of Waterloo. Returning to Prussia after the fall of the Napoleonic Empire, he resumed his position at the Military Academy and was made a general in 1818. In addition to the present treatise, he left historical accounts of the campaigns of 1796, 1799, 1812-1813 and 1815. "War is but the continuation of political transactions, involving the interference of other means...". De la Guerre, a major treatise on military strategy and the philosophy of conflict. Carl von Clausewitz's thinking is based on three initial observations: firstly, the entry of the people into the field of warfare with the French Revolution; secondly, the new practice of total warfare, as practiced by Napoleon I until his adversary was completely crushed; and thirdly, the superiority of defensive and popular warfare over offensive warfare, as illustrated by the experience of the Spanish (1808-1814) and Russians (1812) against the French. De la Guerre is not a simple collection of maxims, but rather a highly structured treatise on systemic thinking, which requires in-depth reading to understand the various concepts. Indeed, for Carl von Clausewitz, nourished by the rationalism of the Enlightenment, was to discover order, logic and calculation in the apparent disorder of war, and to apprehend it in a global strategic vision, i.e. in its logical and temporal development, and in all its aspects, whether military, political or moral. He defines the balance of power as the intersection of the political goal (variable) and the military goal (immutable, consisting of disarming the enemy without being disarmed oneself), but while he affirms that "war is but the continuation of political transactions, involving the interference of other means" (vol. III, p. 195), he nevertheless specifies that the primacy of politics is exercised in war and not on war. Strategic practice remains a duel, in which we must be able to foresee our adversary's reaction to an action, but also the possibility of that adversary modifying his reaction according to his idea of us. So, while theory provides the general characteristics on which the strategist must base his decisions in his particular practice, the genius of the war leader is superior to theory, since theory can only explain a posteriori what this genius consists of. Carl von Clausewitz also emphasized the natural, structural tendency of war to tend towards the absolute, the extreme, the unlimited: any means of achieving victory that can be made useful can lead to a l
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